• Reinstated diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela will facilitate increased trade and crossings at the border, prompting the development of multiple industries, with further trade ties and cooperation expected in the near term.
• Insecurity at the border is likely to persist as criminal groups may stage attacks against travelers and security personnel, as well as facilities and personnel of companies in the region.
• The success of Colombia’s Paz Total peace negotiations with criminal groups also depends on Venezuela’s cooperation. However, Maduro’s crackdown on these groups remains unlikely amid his alleged benefits from their criminal activities in recent years.
• While the Paz Total negotiations are liable to eventually improve security at the border as criminal groups engage in less violence with security forces, the risk of inter-group violence and clashes prevails.
• Those with continuing essential operations in rural and border regions in Colombia and Venezuela are advised to maintain a bolstered private security contingent and remain cognizant of the latent threat of attacks.

Recent developments in Colombia and Venezuela’s diplomatic relations 

• After winning the Colombian presidential election on June 19, 2022, President Gustavo Petro announced his intent to reopen borders with Venezuela, which had been closed since 2015, and restore the “full exercise of human rights” once he assumes office on August 7, 2022.  
• On July 28, 2022, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Carlos Faria and their Colombian counterpart Alvaro Leyva announced the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
• On November 1, 2022, Petro and Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro held their first bilateral meeting in Caracas, Venezuela. Both leaders announced an alliance between their intelligence units and Colombia’s willingness to mediate in dialogues between Venezuela’s ruling government and the opposition. It was also indicated that Venezuela would be invited to reintegrate in the Organization of American States’s Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR). 

Reopening of borders & trade 

• On September 26, 2022, the western border of Venezuela with Colombia opened for the passage of trucks at the Simon Bolivar bridge, connecting San Antonio del Tachira, Taricha in Venezuela with La Parada, Villa Del Rosario, Norte de Santander Colombia. The complete re-opening of the border was initiated on January 1, 2023, including for private cars and motorcycles, at the Simon Bolivar bridge. The Tienditas International Bridge, also known as The Atanasio Girardot Binational Bridge, connecting San Antonio, Tachira, Venezuela and San Jose de Cucuta, Norte de Santander in Colombia, which had been closed for private vehicles since 2015, also reopened on January 1.  
• On January 7, Petro and Maduro made agreements regarding the facilitation of cross-border investments and infrastructure, revision of trade, promotion for the opening of all borders, and facilitation of agricultural, industrial, and service complementation agreements. 
• On February 3, Maduro and the Colombian Minister of Commerce German Umana Mendoza signed the Tratado para la Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca de Inversiones, a treaty aimed at building a legal framework to facilitate binational investments and protect Venezuelan and Colombian nationals and investors. 

Paz Total peace negotiations 

• On November 4, 2022, Petro signed Ley de Orden Publico, promulgating the widely promoted ‘Paz Total’ into a State Policy, allowing the government to conduct dialogue and facilitate political and legal negotiations with armed groups nationwide. Petro further announced his plans to implement the peace agreements signed by the previous government in 2016 with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) dissident groups. By November 29, 2022, over 23 criminal groups reportedly indicated their intent on joining the negotiations. A unilateral ceasefire agreement was reached on December 19, 2022. 
• Maduro agreed to act as guarantor in the peace negotiations with the binational guerilla group Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) on September 13, 2022, following Bogota’s request and asked the Venezuelan army to cooperate with Colombian security forces to support Paz Total. 
• On January 4, the government suspended Decreto 2657, which established a bilateral ceasefire agreement with ELN, after the group announced on January 3 they did not agree to the ceasefire. On January 10, Petro ordered the resumption of military operations against the ELN. On January 21, the government and ELN released a joint statement, announcing that talks will resume on February 13 in Mexico, where a bilateral ceasefire will be negotiated. Negotiations are ongoing as of writing.  
• Meanwhile, the bilateral ceasefire agreement with other criminal groups including the Autodefensas Conquistadores de la Sierra Nevada (ACSN), Clan del Golfo (AGC), Estado Mayor Central de las Fuerzas Armadas Revoulcionarias de Colombia (EMC-FARC), and Segunda Marquetalia (SM) FARC dissident faction remains in place. 

Past diplomatic relations 

• Vehicular and pedestrian movement between the two nations had been restricted since 2015. On August 6, 2018, Maduro accused Colombia’s government and the USA intelligence of being behind an alleged assassination attempt against him, after several explosions were recorded during Maduro’s speech at a military ceremony in Caracas on August 4, 2018.  
• In 2019, former Colombia President Ivan Duque accused Venezuela of allegedly supporting ELN and FARC dissidents by providing the groups a safe haven in Venezuela. This prompted the countries to break off all diplomatic relations. Thereafter, in 2020, Duque recognized Maduro’s political Venezuelan opposition leader, Juan Guaido, as interim president of Venezuela. This led to Maduro accusing Colombia of violating his sovereignty by supporting the opposition. 
• On May 23, 2022, Maduro stated that an uncontrolled fire at the El Cardon oil refinery was part of a ‘terrorist attack’ led by former Colombian President Ivan Duque and unidentified foreign nationals. These developments prompted an increase in military presence and patrols along the border, further escalating tensions. 
• Venezuela’s economic and political crisis created major shortages of basic goods, as well as an increase in illegal migration into Colombia, with reports indicating that as of December 2022, at least 2.48 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants are reportedly in Colombia. 

Security situation at the border  

• Multiple criminal groups, taking advantage of the porous borders and relative impunity on the Venezuelan side, operate along the Colombia-Venezuela border. These include the ELN, AGC, and FARC dissident groups, and smaller and localized criminal networks including paramilitary groups.  
• These groups engage in drug production and trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering, extortion, contraband, and human smuggling, illegal mining, and logging. They are known to utilize violent tactics such as kidnapping, forced recruitment, massacres, forced confinement, and attacks targeting critical infrastructure and security personnel and facilities. As a result, the border region has faced high homicides and displacement rates.

Multiple industries will benefit from border reopening, incentivizing further trade ties and cooperation 

1. Venezuela’s exports of oil, energy, and gas are expected to benefit from the recent reinstatement of trade ties, with energy companies being re-authorized since November 2022 to utilize the Antonio Ricaurte gas pipeline, running from western Venezuela to northern Colombia. This is further likely as Colombia’s government announced on January 20 plans to halt new permissions for oil and gas exploration projects until 2026, thereby potentially increasing import demands, particularly amid a worldwide oil supply deficit from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 
2. The countries’ agricultural sectors are also likely to benefit, with January 1 reports indicating that at least 16 agricultural projects to be developed by the two countries in the coming years have been proposed to the Corporacion Andina de Fomento (CAF) development bank. The production of oil palm, sugar cane, cotton, and livestock is particularly likely to expand.  
3. That said, business uncertainty is likely to prevail through the medium term, given the lack of comprehensive trade agreements and sanitary and customs requirements, as well as Venezuela not being part of CAF yet.  
4. FORECAST: With the increased commercial development via cross-border trade, the overall sociopolitical and economic situation is liable to improve in both nations in the medium-to-long term. The benefit of open borders will likely gain significant popular support. This is likely to motivate both leaders to continue their diplomatic relations, particularly promoting further bilateral trade and investments. This is further evidenced by Maduro indicating on February 3 that a proposal is currently pending for the creation of a binational zone for free trade, free investment, and joint development between Norte de Santander and Tachira.

Insecurity affecting trade and transit at the border to continue as trafficking persists 

1. FORECAST: The latest diplomatic developments are liable to continue facilitating legal trade and crossings at the border. This will increasingly incentivize illegal suppliers to shift into legal economies. It will also encourage cargo and human transport to use the newly opened passages, and for migration to be carried through regular means, abating human smuggling to an extent.  
2. That said, the lack of concrete security, migration, and border movement protocols, deficient infrastructure, and competitive disadvantage over illegal markets, are liable to delay such a transition. This is further evidenced by January 28 reports indicating that, despite the recent reopening of bridges, thousands of individuals are still reportedly using the so-called ‘Trochas’, illegal crossings surveilled by armed groups.   
3. FORECAST: Criminal groups and corrupt officials who benefit from the trochas by collecting fares and accepting bribes are liable to stage attacks against legal passages, its users, and security personnel and facilities. These are particularly likely in Apure, Norte de Santander, and Tachira, where trochas are most common. Alternatively, these groups may attempt to orchestrate extortions at the legal crossings. This is supported by authorities detaining two individuals on the Simon Bolivar International Bridge in Norte de Santander, Colombia on December 26 for allegedly intending to extort several businessowners.  
4. FORECAST: Meanwhile, legal companies in the newly reopened industries will likely be targeted by their illegal counterparts, with a risk of the latter staging attacks against facilities, transportation, and personnel. This is further evidenced by a multinational oil company suspending its activities in Tame and Saravena, Arauca on January 16, after reportedly receiving threats from the Frente de Guerra Oriental ELN faction.
5. FORECAST: Agents involved in illegal markets, including of drugs, arms, and certain minerals are likely to maintain their operations in the area. With contraband and drug trafficking thriving at the border since 2015, it is unlikely to be substantially abated in the near-term. Norte de Santander, which is one of the most profitable territories for drug trade in Colombia, is likely to remain a strategic point for criminal groups. Cocaine production and transit are likely to continue in the south of the Zulia state, bordering the department of La Guajira, Colombia, with ELN and FARC dissidents disputing control for the area. The dispute is liable to persist amid peace talks, given that the groups have not signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement yet. Further, ELN is likely to continue its consolidation in Tachira as a trafficking commercial point, with disputes between ELN and the Tren de Aragua (TA) Venezuelan criminal group also possible there and in Apure, where clandestine airstrips for cocaine transiting are already well established.

Paz Total negotiations to improve security in border area, but risk of inter-group violence will prevail 

1. FORECAST: As Paz Total negotiations between the Colombian government and the several groups operating at the border continue, more ceasefire agreements are likely to be decreed in the near term, as well as protocols for their implementations. This is further evidenced by the meeting between ELN and the government set to take place on February 13, and EMC-FARC agreeing on February 8 to new protocols concerning the implementation of the bilateral ceasefire agreed on December 31, 2022. This is liable to improve the security landscape in the medium term across the Colombia-Venezuela border regions, particularly with a reduction of clashes between security forces and the armed groups. This is further evidenced by Colombia Interior Minister Alfonso Prada stating on January 30 that, in areas where one or more criminal groups participated in the December 31 ceasefire, homicide rates fell by up to 68 percent in January 2023, compared to January 2022. 
2. That said, given the internal fragmentation within decentralized criminal group structures, particularly in the ELN, which increases the scope for discrepancies between the main decision-making body, Commando Central (COCE), and local factions, there remains a potential for some factions to act independently regardless of the ongoing negotiations. Further, insecurity due to the high risk of clashes between rival criminal organizations, including ceasefire signatories and non-signatory groups, will prevail. This is evidenced by clashes between the Frente 10 FARC dissidents and ELN in Lejanias and Normandia communities, in Puerto Rondon, Arauca, leaving 11 dead on January 10. 
3. Meanwhile, the crackdown by Colombian authorities on ELN, FARC, and AGC has continued, as seen by the killing of Luis Gabriel Zea Bernal, alias “Visaje”, leader of the Jose Antonio Galan Front of the ELN in Bolivar on January 23 during a military operation. This is likely intended to demonstrate their commitment to the local population’s security despite the ongoing Paz Total peace negotiations, as well as incentivize groups to adhere to the negotiations or be met with violence.  
4. FORECAST: Colombian military operations against ELN are likely to continue, at least until the negotiations on February 13 end, carrying a high risk of localized retaliatory armed attacks against security units. However, the potential for widespread retaliatory violence is limited given ELN’s continued willingness to engage in peace talks.     
5. FORECAST: In the long-term, even as criminal groups are successfully demobilized in certain areas through peace negotiations, other groups will likely try to capitalize on the power vacuum and may successfully do so should authorities fail to retain control of the area. This was seen after the demobilization of FARC’s factions at the border during its peace accords with the Colombian government in 2016, which was followed by turf wars with ELN, and accompanied by widespread violence. 

Military crackdown on binational groups by Venezuela remains unlikely 

1. With 70 percent of ELN’s operations taking place in the border area, achieving Paz Total’s objectives largely depends on Petro’s ability to demobilize factions in the border area. Meanwhile, multiple reports suggest that Venezuela has been permitting the group’s operations and growth within the country, including colluding with ELN to provide security services at the border against Colombia’s army and FARC factions. This disincentivizes criminal groups to consider peace negotiations, as they can instead consolidate freely on the Venezuelan side, making Petro dependent on Maduro’s commitment to crackdown on these groups to succeed in his Paz Total efforts.  
2. Although Maduro has agreed to be a guarantor in ELN peace talks, and despite Caracas agreeing to assist Colombian security operations, concerns are likely to persist over the legitimacy of ongoing and upcoming security operations by Venezuelan forces. This is particularly so as the locations where recent drug seizures occurred, mostly in Zulia and Falcon, do not align with prominent drug trafficking routes. This indicates operations are not aimed at cracking down on drug-trafficking groups as a whole, but rather targeted at specific groups and locations. The lack of a proper crackdown is further likely as the Venezuelan army might not have such capabilities, as for example, it was only able to remove the FARC 10th front from Apure in early 2021 by staging joint operations with ELN.  
3. FORECAST: Further, a bolstered military presence at the border, seen for example when Venezuela initiated military operations at the border on September 10, 2019, in “preparation for an offensive” from Colombia, is unlikely to remain amid the improvement of bilateral ties. Criminal groups may attempt to capitalize on the change in militarization and conduct attacks against security personnel and facilities, as well as rival criminal groups. 
4. FORECAST: Maduro’s diplomatic collaboration with Petro regarding Paz Total negotiations and drug seizures at the border may continue as he aims to advance their trade ties amid domestic economic problems. However, a full-force military crackdown on binational groups, and particularly on ELN, at the border remains unlikely, as multiple Human Rights organizations and international bodies have denounced Maduro’s use of his ties with criminal groups to assert his political power domestically. This includes Maduro allegedly utilizing such groups to abate mass protests, benefitting economically from illegal mining amid a collapsed oil sector, and receiving monetary cuts from criminal economies in return for relative impunity. 

1. Those with continuing essential operations in rural and border regions in Colombia and Venezuela, particularly in Amazonas, Apure, Arauca, Cesar, La Guajira, Norte de Santander, Tachira, Vichada, Zulia, are advised to maintain a bolstered private security contingent in order to secure any facilities. 
2. Those intending to cross the border between Colombia and Venezuela are advised to allot for disruptions to travel due to security checkpoints and remain cognizant of the updated border crossing procedures. 
3. Ensure you have the required travel documents on you at all times and can produce them if asked at checkpoints. 
4. Avoid nonessential road travel in rural areas, including on interstate highways. 
5. In the event that a facility or operation is targeted by insurgent groups, it is advised to evacuate nonessential personnel immediately from the site, while avoiding any interaction with the criminal groups where possible and contacting local and home-nation authorities. 
6. Remain cognizant of local media updates regarding areas with a significant presence of armed groups, given the dynamic nature of the violence.